In the framework of the game-theoretic probability of Shafer and Vovk (2001) it is of basic importance to construct an explicit strategy weakly forcing the strong law of large numbers (SLLN) in the bounded forecasting game. We present a simple finite-memory strategy based on the past average of Reality's moves, which weakly forces the strong law of large numbers with the convergence rate of O( log n/n). Our proof is very simple compared to a corresponding measure-theoretic result of Azuma (1967) on bounded martingale differences and this illustrates effectiveness of game-theoretic approach. We also discuss one-sided protocols and extension of results to linear protocols in general dimension.
Introduction
The book by Shafer and Vovk (2001) established the whole new field of game-theoretic probability and finance. Their framework provides an attractive alternative foundation of probability theory. Compared to the conventional measure theoretic probability, the game theoretic probability treats the sets of measure zero in a very explicit way when proving various probabilistic laws, such as the strong law of large numbers. In a game-theoretic proof, we can explicitly describe the behavior of the paths on a set of measure zero, whereas in measure-theoretic proofs the sets of measure zero are often simply ignored.
Reality announces x n ∈ [−1, 1]. K n := K n−1 + M n x n . END FOR For a fixed ǫ, |ǫ| < 1, the ǫ-strategy sets M n = ǫK n−1 . Under this strategy Skeptic's capital process K n is written as K n = n i=1 (1 + ǫx i ) or log K n = n i=1 log(1 + ǫx i ).
For sufficiently small |ǫ|, log K n is approximated as
The right-hand side is maximized by taking
In particular in the fair-coin game, where x n is restricted as x n = ±1, approximately optimum ǫ is given as
Actually, as shown by Takeuchi ([9] ), it is easy to check that ǫ =x n exactly maximizes n i=1 (1+ǫx i ) for the case of the fair-coin game. Recently Kumon, Takemura and Takeuchi (2005) [5] give a detailed analysis of Bayesian strategies for the biased-coin games, which include the strategy ǫ =x n as a special case.
Of course, the above approximately optimum ǫ is chosen in hindsight, i.e., we can choose optimum ǫ after seeing the moves x 1 , . . . , x n . However it suggests to choose M n based on the past averagex n−1 of Reality's moves. Therefore consider a strategy
In the next section we prove that for 0 < c ≤ 1/2 this strategy is weakly forcing SLLN. The restriction 0 < c ≤ 1/2 is just for convenience for the proof and in Kumon, Takemura and Takeuchi (2005) we consider c = 1 for biased-coin games.
Compared to a single fixed ǫ-strategy M n = ǫK n−1 or the mixture ǫ-strategy in Chapter 3 of Shafer and Vovk (2001) , letting ǫ = cx n−1 depend onx n−1 seems to be reasonable from the viewpoint of effectiveness of Skeptic's strategy. The basic reason is that asx n−1 deviates more from the origin, Skeptic should try to exploit this bias in Reality's moves by betting a larger amount. Clearly this reasoning is shaky because for each round Skeptic has to move first and Reality can decide her move after seeing Skeptic's move. However in the next section we show that the strategy in (1) is indeed weakly forcing SLLN with the convergence rate of O( log n/n).
Weakly forcing SLLN by past averages
In this section we prove the following result.
Theorem 3.1 In the bounded forecasting game, if Skeptic uses the strategy (1) with 0 < c ≤ 1/2, then lim sup n K n = ∞ for each path ξ = x 1 x 2 . . . of Reality's moves such that
This theorem states that the strategy (1) weakly forces thatx n converges to 0 with the convergence rate of O( log n/n). Therefore it is much stronger than the mixture ǫ-strategy in Chapter 3 of Shafer and Vovk (2001) , which only forces convergence to 0. A corresponding measure theoretic result was stated in Theorem 1 of Azuma (1967) as discussed in Remark 3.1 at the end of this section. The rest of this section is devoted to a proof of Theorem 3.1.
By comparing 1, 1/2, 1/3, . . . , and the integral of 1/x we have
Next, by summing up the term
Now consider the sum
When we expand the right-hand side, the coefficient of the term x j x k , j < k, is given by
We now consider the coefficient of x 2 j . In (4) we have the sum from i = 2 and we need to treat x 1 separately. The coefficient of x 2 1 is 1 − 1/n from (3). For j ≥ 2, the coefficient of x 2 j is given by 1/(j − 1) − 1/n, as in the case of the cross terms. Therefore
Writex 0 = 0. Then the first sum on the right-hand side can be written from i = 1. Under this notational convention (5) is rewritten as
Now the capital process K n = K P n of (1) is written as
As in Chapter 3 of Shafer and Vovk (2001) we use
and under the restriction |x n | ≤ 1, ∀n, we can further bound log K n from below as
By considering the restriction |x n | ≤ 1, (6) is bounded from below as
Since c ≤ 1/2, substituting this into (7) yields
Now if lim sup n √ n|x n |/ √ log n > 1, then lim sup n log K n = +∞ because log n ↑ ∞. This proves the theorem. Dembo and Zeitouni (1998) , Azuma (1967) , Hoeffding (1963) , Bennett (1962) ). Let X 1 , X 2 , . . . be a sequence of martingale differences such that |X n | ≤ 1, ∀n. Then for any
Remark 3.1 In the framework of the conventional measure theoretic probability, a strong law of large numbers analogous to Theorem 3.1 can be proved using Azuma-HoeffdingBennett inequality (Appendix A.7 of Vovk, Gammerman and Shafer (2005), Section 2.4 of
Fix an arbitrary α > 1/2. Then for any ǫ > 0
Therefore by Borel-Cantelli √ n|X n |/(log n) α → 0 almost surely. Actually Theorem 1 of Azuma (1967) states the following stronger result 
One-sided protocol
In this section we consider one-sided bounded forecasting game where M n is restricted to be nonnegative (M n ≥ 0), i.e. Skeptic is only allowed to buy tickets. We also consider the restriction M n ≤ 0. In Chapter 3 of Shaver and Vovk, weak forcing of SLLN is proved by combining positive and negative one-sided strategies, whereas in the previous section we proved that a single strategy P = P c weakly forces SLLN. Therefore it is of interest to investigate whether one-sided version of our strategy weakly forces one-sided SLLN. We adopt the same notations as Section 5 of Kumon, Takemura and Takeuchi (2005), where one-sided protocols for biased-coin games are studied.
For the positive one-sided case consider the strategy P + with
Similarly we consider negative one-sided strategy P − with M n = −cx
For these protocols we have the following theorem. 
Similarly if Skeptic uses the strategy P − with 0 < c ≤ 1/2, then lim sup n K n = ∞ for each path ξ = x 1 x 2 . . . of Reality's moves such that lim inf n √ nx n / √ log n < − 3/2.
The rest of this section is devoted to a proof of this theorem for P + . Ifx n is eventually all nonnegative, then the behavior of the capital process K P n and K P + n are asymptotically equivalent except for a constant factor reflecting some initial segment of Reality's path ξ. Then the theorem follows from Theorem 3.1. On the other hand ifx n is eventually negative, then K P + n stays constant and Theorem 4.1 holds trivially. Therefore we only need to consider the case thatx n changes sign infinitely often. Note that at time n when x n changes the sign, the overshoot is bounded as
We consider capital process after a sufficiently large time n 0 such thatx n 0 ≃ 0, and proceed to divide the sequence {x n } into the following two types of blocks. For n 0 ≤ k ≤ l − 1, consider a block {k, . . . , l − 1}. We call it a nonnegative block if
Similarly we call it a negative block if
By definition, negative and nonnegative blocks are alternating.
For a nonnegative block
whereas for a negative block K
Taking the logarithm of (9) we have log K
From (6) it follows
In the above, we used the approximation formula
Thus we obtain log K
Now starting at n 0 , we consider adding the right-hand side of (10) for nonnegative blocks and 0 = log K
for negative blocks. Then after passing sufficiently many blocks, log K
behave as (10) during half number of the entire blocks. Therefore at the beginning n k of the last nonnegative block, we have log K
To finish the proof of Theorem 4.1, let n be in a middle of the last nonnegative block {n k , . . . n l−1 }. Then as above, we have log K
Adding (11) and (12) we have log K
Noting that n k = O(n), we derive
This completes the proof of Theorem 4.1.
Multivariate linear protocol
In this section we generalize Theorem 3.1 to multivariate linear protocols. See Section 3 of Vovk, Nouretdinov, Takemura and Shafer (2005) [12] and Section 6 of Takemura and Suzuki (2005) [7] for discussions of linear protocols. Since the following generalization works for any dimension, including the case of infinite dimension, we assume that Skeptic and Reality choose elements from a Hilbert space H. The inner product of x, y ∈ H is denoted by x · y and the norm of x ∈ H denoted by x = (x · x) 1/2 . Actually we do not specifically use properties of infinite dimensional space and readers may just think of H as a finite dimensional Euclidean space R m . For example spectral resolution below just corresponds to the spectral decomposition of a nonnegative definite matrix.
Let X ⊂ H denote the move space of Reality, and assume that X is bounded. Then by rescaling we can say without loss of generality that X is contained in the unit ball
In this case the closed convex hull co(X ) of X is contained in the unit ball. As in [7] we also assume that the origin 0 belongs to co(X ). Note also that the averagex n of Reality's moves always belongs to co(X ) and hence x n ≤ 1. In order to be clear, we write out our game for multivariate linear protocol.
Bounded Linear Protocol Game in General Dimension
Protocol:
Reality announces x n ∈ X .
As a natural multivariate generalization of the strategy P c given by (1), we consider the strategy P = P
where A is a self-adjoint operator in H. Then A has the spectral resolution
where E denotes the real spectral measure of A, or the resolution of the identity corresponding to A. Let σ(A) denote the spectrum of A (i.e. the support of E) and let
In the finite dimensional case, c 0 and c 1 correspond to the smallest and the largest eigenvalue of the matrix A, respectively. Now we have the following generalization of Theorem 3.1.
Theorem 5.1 In the bounded linear protocol game in general dimension, if Skeptic uses the strategy (13) with
0 < c 0 ≤ c 1 ≤ 1/2. Then lim sup n K n = ∞ for each path ξ = x 1 x 2 . . . of Reality's moves such that lim sup n √ n x n √ log n > c 1 c 0 .
Proof:
In the expression
we have
By the Schwarz's inequality,
Hence as in (7), we can bound log K n from below as
The first term also can be expressed as in (6), and it is bounded from below as follows.
Combining (17) and (18), we have
It follows that if lim sup n √ n ȳ n / √ c 1 log n > 1, then lim sup n log K n = +∞. Now the theorem follows from c 0 x n 2 ≤ ȳ n 2 .
Note that Here we summarize the mixture ǫ-strategy in Chapter 3 of Shafer and Vovk (2001) for the bounded forecasting game in such a way that its resource requirement (computational time and memory) becomes explicit. For a single fixed ǫ-strategy P ǫ , which sets M n = ǫK n−1 , the capital process is given as K
(1 + ǫx i ). Shafer and Vovk combine P ǫ for many values of ǫ. Let 1/2 ≥ ǫ 1 > ǫ 2 > · · · > 0 be a sequence of positive numbers converging to 0. Write
.. be a probability distribution on the set of integers Z, such that p 0 = 0 and p −k = p k (symmetric). Actually p k is the initial amount (out of 1 dollar) put into the account with the strategy P ǫ k , k = ±1, ±2, . . . . For example we could take
as is done in Chapter 3 of Shafer and Vovk (2001). However it is more convenient here to leave ǫ k and p k to be general. Then the mixture strategy weakly forcing SLLN is given by the weighted average of the strategies P ǫ k , k = ±1, ±2, . . . , with respect to the weights {p k } k=0,±1,±2,... , namely
Consider the value M * n of P * . It is written as
Now introduce the elementary symmetric functions e n,0 , e n,1 , . . . , e n,n of the numbers x 1 , . . . , x n as
Recall that the set of values {x 1 , . . . , x n } and the set of values {e n,1 , . . . , e n,n } are in oneto-one relationship. Therefore computing all the values of the elementary symmetric functions of {x 1 , . . . , x n } is computationally equivalent to keep all the values of {x 1 , . . . , x n }. µ i+1 e n−1,i .
At this point it becomes clear that we can take an arbitrary probability distribution F on [−1/2, 1/2] provided that F is not degenerate at 0 and 0 is the point of support, i.e., for all ǫ > 0 F (ǫ) − F (−ǫ) > 0. In order to compute the M * n we need all the values of the elementary symmetric functions e n−1,i , i = 1, . . . , n − 1, which is equivalent to keeping all the values of {x 1 , . . . , x n−1 } as discussed above. Therefore the mixture ǫ-strategy needs a memory of size proportional to n at time n, whereas our strategy in (1) only needs to keep track of the values ofx n−1 and K n−1 .
